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  Currently, Europeans traveling abroad confront 
frustrations when trying to access their subscriptions to 
Internet streaming services such as Netflix or Amazon Prime. 
Often, their attempts to access a movie or show are met with a 
message stating something along the lines of: “We are sorry. 
This content is not available in your country or territory.” In 
the vernacular of the audiovisual industry, their content is 
“geo-blocked” in that nation. This is due to the fact that, 
under the European Union’s current regulatory framework, 
producers of audiovisual content finance and distribute their 
shows in a system based on territorial exclusivity. Territorial 
exclusivity entails selling exclusive broadcast rights for 
audiovisual content to specific broadcasters and online 
platforms on a territory-by-territory or country-by-country 
basis. However, this may all be changing soon for the 
European Union. In May 2015, the European Commission 
announced its plan for a Digital Single Market, a 
multifaceted proposal aiming to tear down regulatory and 
geo-blocking walls between the European Union’s Member 
States and to create a single, pan-European online market. 
 This Note explores the potential financial and cultural 
implications of this DSM strategy for the film and television 
 
∗ J.D. Candidate 2017, Columbia Law School; B.A. 2011, Georgetown 
University. Many thanks to Professor Lance Liebman for his thoughtful 
guidance and feedback during the production of this Note. Thanks are also 
due to the brilliant staff and editorial board of the Columbia Business Law 
Review for their diligent work in preparing this Note for publication. 
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industries in the European Union and the United States. The 
benefits of a pan-European territory for audiovisual content 
distribution rights will be immediately clear to consumers. 
Cross-border portability and availability of subscriptions, 
movies, and shows will likely be applauded. However, this 
Note suggests the potential costs of such a unification effort, 
although less immediately evident, may be substantial. In 
particular, cultural diversity within the European Union and 
the ability of smaller nations’ audiovisual industry players to 
compete may suffer if the costs of production and distribution 
increase to a pan-European scale. Throughout the growth and 
development of the European Union, there has been a struggle 
between concerns for harmonization and unification among 
the Member States and concerns for the preservation of 
unique cultural identities and diversity. The debate over the 
DSM is a microcosm of this balancing act, the latest chapter 
of an ongoing tension to define to what lengths the EU should 
go in unifying its Members. The European Commission’s 
ultimate determination of how to enact the DSM will signal 
how they currently prioritize these competing considerations. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In May 2015, the European Commission (“EC”) 
announced its long-awaited strategy for a Digital Single 
Market (“DSM”) among the European Union’s twenty-eight 
Member States. The strategy comprised a multifaceted 
proposal aiming to “tear down regulatory walls and finally 
move from 28 national markets to a single one.”1 Identified 
by EC President Jean-Claude Juncker as one of his ten 
 
1 European Commission Press Release IP/15/4919, A Digital Single 
Market for Europe: Commission Sets Out 16 Initiatives to Make It Happen 
(May 6, 2015), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-4919_en.htm 
[https://perma.cc/Y4EP-9YHM]. 
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political priorities,2 the DSM strategy reflects the EC’s 
intention to create a free-moving economy “where individuals 
and businesses can seamlessly access and exercise online 
activities under conditions of fair competition, and a high 
level of consumer and personal data protection, irrespective 
of their nationality or place of residence.”3 The DSM strategy 
is complex and wide in scope, proposing reforms in areas 
including e-commerce, cyber-security, telecommunications, 
cloud services, parcel delivery, and audiovisual content, 
among others.4 If successful, the EC estimates a fully 
functioning DSM could potentially contribute €415 billion to 
European gross domestic product and allow consumers and 
businesses alike to benefit from the larger unified 
marketplace.5 
Despite its touted benefits, the DSM strategy has its 
critics. For example, members of the film and television 
industries in Europe and the United States are concerned 
about the economic and cultural ramifications of a pan-
European digital market that no longer recognizes the 
traditional territorial barriers between Member States or the 
exclusive copyright and distribution rights for digital content 
 
2 See Jean-Claude Juncker, A New Start for Europe: My Agenda for 
Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic Change (Jul. 15, 2014), 
http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/sites/beta-political/files/juncker-political-
guidelines-speech_en_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z8PD-YUVC].  
3 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, 
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions: A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe, at 
3, COM (2015) 192 final (May 6, 2015), http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/digital
-single-market_en (follow “Communication on Digital Single Market” 
hyperlink under “Documents” subsection) [https://perma.cc/G328-A8CN].  
4 See European Commission Press Release IP/15/4919, supra note 1. 
5 Commission Staff Working Document: A Digital Single Market 
Strategy for Europe⎯Analysis and Evidence, at 5, SWD (2015) 100 final 
(May 6, 2015), http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/digital-single-market_en 
(follow “Staff working paper on Digital Single Market” hyperlink under 
“Documents” subsection) [https://perma.cc/GDV4-4JLM] [hereinafter 
Commission Staff Working Document].  
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held within them.6 Their uneasiness centers on the EC’s 
commitment to ending “unjustified geo-blocking” and 
creating a “modern, more European copyright law” that 
harmonizes different national copyright regimes.7 
Under the current European regulatory framework, 
producers can finance their shows and films through means 
of territorial exclusivity. Territorial exclusivity entails selling 
exclusive broadcast rights to different broadcasters and 
online platforms (e.g., Netflix) territory-by-territory within 
the EU. Accordingly, content producers can maximize their 
revenues by selling the same content repeatedly to audiences 
in different territories.8 To effectuate these territorial 
copyright and distribution rights, content is “geo-blocked” to 
users in outside markets.9 For example, the film rights 
Netflix owns in Germany may be different than the film 
rights Netflix owns in the Netherlands. As such, when 
German tourists visit the Netherlands and attempt to access 
their Netflix accounts, they will be geo-blocked from 
accessing the usual catalogue of shows and films included in 
their German subscriptions.  
Under the DSM strategy, however, the legality of these 
geo-blocking mechanisms is in doubt.10 The EC intends for 
 
6 See Stephen Edwards & James Tobias, Reed Smith LLP, The 
European Digital Single Market: Where Are We Now?, JD SUPRA (Oct. 21, 
2015), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-european-digital-single-mar 
ket-81315 [https://perma.cc/GS8J-8SDK] (summarizing the “apprehension” 
within the audiovisual industry caused by the DSM strategy); see also 
Scott Roxborough, Can Europe Set Up a Digital Single Market Without 
Killing Copyrights? (Analysis), THE HOLLYWOOD REP. (May 8, 2015, 9:11 
AM), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/europe-digital-single-market 
-analysis-794386 [https://perma.cc/WM53-N3UQ] (quoting participants in 
the film and television industries voicing their concerns with the DSM).  
7 See European Commission Press Release IP/15/4919, supra note 1. 
8 See Alex Spence, In Europe, Debate over Streaming Video and Geo-
Blocking, POLITICO (Sept. 18, 2015, 9:26 AM), http://www.politico.com/medi
a/story/2015/09/in-europe-debate-over-streaming-video-and-geo-blocking-
004149 [https://perma.cc/C8PW-H6VV].  
9 Id. 
10 Andrus Ansip, the former Estonian prime minister and current 
EU’s DSM commissioner overseeing the reforms, has expressed in no 
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the DSM strategy to end “unjustified geo-blocking” to create 
greater portability and accessibility to digital content 
throughout the continent while “nurturing cultural diversity” 
and “opening new opportunities for creators and the content 
industry.”11 Members of the film and television industries 
fear, however, that while the end of geo-blocking and the 
territoriality of copyright may increase the portability of 
content, it will in fact have a negative effect on cultural 
diversity and the ability of smaller participants to compete in 
the larger market.12 This fear stems in part from the EC’s 
failure to clearly differentiate “unjustified” from “justified” 
geo-blocking practices.13 In sum, while a DSM is an end goal 
supported by a vast majority of member states and 
lawmakers, the means by which that end is realized is a 
topic of debate, particularly in the realm of copyright law. 
This Note provides a survey of the potential financial and 
cultural implications of the DSM strategy in the film and 
television industries, both within the EU and the United 
States. The development and implementation of the EC’s 
DSM strategy remains in its early stages, with preliminary 
legislative proposals concerning geo-blocking and copyright 
 
uncertain terms his distaste for geo-blocking measures, stating: “Deep in 
my heart, I hate [geo-blocking]. It is old-fashioned and it is not fair.” 
Duncan Robinson, EU's Andrus Ansip Unveils Plans to Overhaul Digital 
Market, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2015, 3:09 PM), http://www.ft.com/ (search 
for the title through the search bar); see also Jennifer Baker, ‘I Don’t 
NEED to Pay’ to Watch Football, Thunders EU Digi-Czar, THE REGISTER 
(Dec. 9, 2014, 3:03 PM), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/12/09/ansips_lo
ve_of_football_drives_copyright_overhaul [https://perma.cc/2GL9-WCR2] 
(“Ansip . . . said: ‘I pay my taxes in Estonia, so why, when in Brussels, 
can’t I watch content I bought legally. As a [license] payer I should be able 
to watch the football, but I find it’s blocked, blocked, blocked!’”).  
11 See European Commission Press Release IP/15/4919, supra note 1. 
12 See Edwards & Tobias, supra note 6. 
13 See Roxborough, supra note 6. See also Jaroen Jansen, DLA Piper, 
Upcoming EU Copyright Reform, JD SUPRA (Aug. 4, 2015), 
http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/upcoming-eu-copyright-reform-79271 
[https://perma.cc/XJ8L-LSQF] (noting the pending challenge of 
differentiating between justified from unjustified geo-blocking).  
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reform having been released in December 2015.14 These 
initial proposals are not expected to come into force until 
2017, indicating that it will be some time until the full DSM 
strategy takes effect within the EU and the ramifications of 
the policies can be examined.15 This Note aims to explain the 
impetus for a DSM within the audiovisual industry, discuss 
how the EC is working to achieve a DSM, and consider the 
costs and benefits consumers and businesses may see as a 
result of the EC’s actions. Part II summarizes the state of the 
European audiovisual sector and the legal framework the 
film and television industries currently operate within, both 
on a European and national level. This includes a discussion 
detailing the mechanisms of territorial exclusivity and geo-
blocking. Part III discusses the problems of portability and 
cross-border access currently within the film and television 
industries, the DSM’s plans to address these problems, as 
well as the potential cultural and economic issues the DSM 
strategy poses for consumers and businesses. It suggests that 
territorial exclusivity must be preserved in order to protect 
the viability of smaller players in the European audiovisual 
industry, as well as cultural diversity. Part IV discusses 
pending developments and next-steps for the EC in 
implementing the DSM, including suggestions for how the 
EC can better increase portability of digital content among 
EU nations, yet still allow for a system of territorial 
exclusivity. These suggestions include addressing portability 
concerns through commercial and contractual instruments as 
opposed to governmental regulation, and the idea of a 
“Virtual Passport,” which allows physical travelers to travel 
digitally as well. The EC’s ultimate determination regarding 
 
14 See European Commission Press Release IP/15/6261, Commission 
Takes First Steps to Broaden Access to Online Content and Outlines Its 
Vision to Modernise EU Copyright Rules (Dec. 9, 2015), http://europa.eu/ra
pid/press-release_IP-15-6261_en.htm [https://perma.cc/RQZ9-33L4]. 
15 Tom Scourfield et al., CMS Cameron McKenna, The EU’s 
Portability Proposal – an Attainable Step Towards a Digital Single Market, 
CMS: LAW-NOW (Dec. 14, 2015), http://www.cms-lawnow.com (click “View 
more alerts” hyperlink and search by date) [https://perma.cc/3M6H-
K6ME]. 
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the DSM will depend on their prioritization of many 
competing considerations, including consumer experience, 
protection of European business from American competition, 
the homogenizing of the European Union, and the 
preservation of cultural diversity within Member States. 
II. THE EUROPEAN AUDIOVISUAL SECTOR 
A.  The Legal Framework of Territorial Exclusivity 
1.  The Principle of Territoriality in Copyright 
Currently, stakeholders in the European Union’s 
audiovisual industries operate under a framework of 
territorial copyrights, meaning they negotiate, license, and 
acquire the rights to works of audiovisual content (e.g., film, 
television shows, and sports broadcasts) on a territory-by-
territory basis.16 Accordingly, the European Commission 
traditionally has defined the geographic scope of 
broadcasting markets for antitrust enforcement purposes as 
national or based on areas of shared linguistic or socio-
cultural background (e.g., a copyright holder may license 
broadcasting rights to Germany, Austria, and the German 
speaking parts of Switzerland and Luxembourg as a single 
territory).17 This practice is grounded in the principle of 
territoriality in copyright law. According to this principle, 
each country may promulgate its own copyright rules within 
the broader framework of relevant international and EU 
laws.18 
Inherently, copyright protection over a work entitles a 
holder to a degree of exclusivity over the use of that work. 
The geographic scope of such exclusivity granted under any 
Member State’s copyright law is limited to the territorial 
 
16 FRANCISCO JAVIER CABRERA BLÁZQUEZ ET AL., IRIS PLUS 2015-2: 
TERRITORIALITY AND ITS IMPACT ON THE FINANCING OF AUDIOVISUAL WORKS 
132–33 (2015), http://www.obs.coe.int (click “Publications” tab and click 
“2015”) [https://perma.cc/S3CN-MK9D] [hereinafter BLÁZQUEZ ET AL.].  
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 27. 
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boundaries of that Member State.19 The significance of this 
framework is that copyright holders, such as authors and 
producers, have the right to grant licenses on a territorial 
basis.20 As a result, a service or content provider distributing 
online copyrighted works in multiple Member States must 
obtain licenses covering each relevant territory.21 
Critics of the principle of territoriality within EU 
copyright law point to several legal consequences. First, 
variation in complex national copyright regimes among 
states makes compliance more difficult, creating legal 
uncertainty and additional legal costs.22 Second, for those 
wanting to offer a copyrighted work in multiple territories, 
obtaining multiple licenses raises transaction costs, which 
are borne by both license-acquirers and their consumers.23 
Last, authors, publishers, broadcasters, and other right-
holders must bear increased monitoring and enforcement 
costs to ensure others do not violate their respective rights.24 
Nevertheless, copyright territoriality also generates clear 
benefits for content producers and derivative right-holders. 
The key upshot of the principle is that territorial licensing 
provides authors and content producers the opportunity to 
receive higher remuneration for their works. Furthermore, 
territoriality allows for price discrimination between 
national markets, enabling rights-holders to cater their 
offerings to the preferences and economics of each territory.25 
Territorial licensing also facilitates the marketing and 
distribution of works in foreign markets, where license-
 
19 P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ, COPYRIGHT TERRITORIALITY IN THE EUROPEAN 
UNION 2 (Eur. Parliament Directorate Gen. for Internal Policies, Policy 
Dep’t C: Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs ed., 2010), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/note/join/2010/419621/IPO
L-JURI_NT(2010)419621_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/GT7X-5Z2M]. 
20 BLÁZQUEZ ET AL., supra note 16, at 27. 
21 Id. at 30. 
22 HUGENHOLTZ, supra note 19, at 2, 5–6. 
23 Id. at 2, 12. 
24 Id. at 2, 11. 
25 Id. at 2, 11–12. 
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acquirers may need to modify such works for consumption by 
local audiences.26 Lastly, each nation or territory has the 
ability to better control internal competition and protect 
cultural subsidies through means such as collective rights 
management societies.27 
2.  Development of Cross-Border Recognition 
In the EU’s fragmented system of territorial copyrights, 
Member States must mutually respect the copyright 
protections granted by other Member States in order for the 
protection to be meaningful. Prior to the nineteenth century, 
a work protected in one nation was not necessarily protected 
in other nations, resulting in the unauthorized and 
unremunerated copying of creative works outside the 
nation.28 Through a series of conventions, agreements, and 
directives, multilateral solutions emerged for the cross-
border recognition of copyright protection. The initial step 
was the adoption in 1886 of the Berne Convention, which 
provided authors with certain minimum rights of protection 
in all of the Convention’s contracting states.29 Later, the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (“TRIPS”), negotiated in 1994, added heightened 
obligations to the mandatory protection standards of the 
Berne Convention.30 Around the same time, agreements 
through the World Intellectual Property Organization 
 
26 Id. at 11–12. 
27 Id. at 2, 12. As Dr. Hugenholtz discusses, collective rights 
management societies currently exist on a territorial basis. These societies 
capitalize on collectively pooled intellectual property rights, funneling the 
proceeds not only to entitled right-holders, but also cultural and social 
funds that benefit local authors. “[These] societies thus play an important 
role in fostering ‘cultural diversity’ in the EU. Removing the territorial 
aspect of performance and communication rights would not only affect 
these de facto cultural subsidies, but also undermine the societies’ very 
existence, except for a handful of societies that are large enough, or 
sufficiently efficient, to compete at the European level.” Id. at 12. 
28 BLÁZQUEZ ET AL., supra note 16, at 28. 
29 Id. at 29. 
30 Id. 
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(“WIPO”), such as the WIPO Copyright Treaty adopted in 
December 1996, responded to developments in the Internet 
and digitization while building on the principle of 
territoriality.31 
3.  Harmonization of EU Law in the Audiovisual 
Sector 
Due to the cross-border nature of audiovisual commerce 
within the EU, a tension exists between Members States 
when their audiovisual regulations or copyright regimes 
conflict.32 Through a series of agreements and directives, the 
EU has alleviated some of this tension regarding competing 
national audiovisual regulations and has helped provide 
legal certainty for content distributors and producers.33 
Nonetheless, Member States’ copyright regimes remain 
highly fragmented, forcing members of the audiovisual 
industry to comply with the varying copyright laws of each 
Member State where they distribute content.34 
Based on the principle of territoriality, a nation 
principally develops and controls its own audiovisual 
regulations. Member States are free to enact rules regarding 
broadcasters, distributors, and on-demand services within 
their jurisdiction, including regulations requiring financial 
contributions and the promotion of European-produced 
content.35 However, as mentioned, the EU has passed a 
series of directives to harmonize certain aspects of legal 
regimes between its Member States, thereby alleviating the 
negative consequences of territorial laws,36 as well as 
 
31 Id. at 29–30. 
32 See generally id. 
33 See id. at 30. 
34 Id. See also Estrella Gomez & Bertin Martens, Language, Copyright 
and Geographic Segmentation in the EU Digital Single Market for Music 
and Film 1 (Eur. Comm’n, Digital Economy Working Paper 2015-04, 
2015), https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/sites/default/files/JRC92236_Language_Cop
yright.pdf [https://perma.cc/YX8U-NDVW]. 
35 BLÁZQUEZ ET AL., supra note 16, at 23–24.  
36 E.g., legal uncertainty and higher transaction costs. 
WEISS – FINAL 
888 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2016 
promoting a unified EU market.37 The Information Society 
Directive, for instance, harmonizes the legal treatment of 
rights of reproduction and distribution, anti-copying devices, 
and rights management systems.38 The Satellite and Cable 
Directive (“SatCab Directive”) introduced the “country of 
origin” principle to facilitate cross-border transmission of 
audiovisual programs by satellite.39 Under the “country of 
origin” principle, audiovisual service providers can operate in 
all Member States across Europe but must only abide by the 
rules of the Member State where they are established.40 
Establishment is based on factors such as the location of the 
head office, the origin of editorial decisions, the location of a 
significant part of the workforce involved in the pursuit of 
the audiovisual media service activity, and/or the use of 
satellite capacity.41 
The Audiovisual Media Services Directive (“AVMSD”) 
explicitly applies the “country of origin” principle to all 
audiovisual media services, including television broadcasts 
and on-demand services.42 Article 2(1) of AVMSD states: 
“Each Member State shall ensure that all audiovisual media 
services transmitted by media service providers under its 
jurisdiction comply with the rules of the system of law 
applicable to audiovisual media services intended for the 
public in that Member State.”43 Article 3(1) of AVMSD builds 
on this principle, ensuring that compliant services are able to 
 
37 BLÁZQUEZ ET AL., supra note 16, at 30. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Commission Staff Working Document, supra note 5, at 43. 
41 BLÁZQUEZ ET AL., supra note 16, at 23, 38–39. 
42 Commission Staff Working Document, supra note 5, at 43–44. 
43 Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 10 March 2010 on the Coordination of Certain Provisions Laid 
Down by Law, Regulation or Administrative Action in Member States 
Concerning the Provision of Audiovisual Media Services (Audiovisual 
Media Services Directive), art. 2, 2010 O.J. (L 95) 13, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu (search for “Directive 2010/13/EU”) [https://perma.cc/93Q9-
RD62].  
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circulate freely in other Member States.44 The AVMSD sets a 
baseline for audiovisual industry regulations and then allows 
for Member States to build upon it; Article 4(1) states that 
Member States can “require media service providers under 
their jurisdiction to comply with more detailed or stricter 
rules in the fields coordinated by this Directive provided that 
such rules are in compliance with Union law.”45 In 
accordance with the “country of origin” principle, however, 
Member States with higher standards may not restrict the 
reception of media services from providers subject to the 
jurisdiction of Member States with lower standards.46 The 
key benefit of the “country of origin” principle is that it 
provides legal certainty, allowing a provider established in 
one state to freely distribute an audiovisual media service 
across other states without needing further authorization or 
compliance with these other states’ rules.47 
While the “country of origin” principle articulated in the 
AVMSD is focused on harmonizing EU Member State 
audiovisual rules, it does not apply to national copyright 
regimes. Contrary to the AVMSD, Article 3(3) of the e-
Commerce Directive applies the “country of destination” 
principle to the copyright sector.48 According to the “country 
 
44 AVMSD Article 3(1) reads: “Member States shall ensure freedom of 
reception and shall not restrict retransmissions on their territory of 
audiovisual media services from other Member States for reasons which 
fall within the fields coordinated by this Directive.” Id. art. 3. 
45 Id. art. 4, at 14.  
46 Commission Staff Working Document, supra note 5, at 43. 
47 BLÁZQUEZ ET AL., supra note 16, at 34; see also Commission Staff 
Working Document, supra note 5, at 45 (“[The country of origin principle] 
creates legal certainty, saves costs and increases the number of potential 
viewers. It has facilitated the development of new trans-border business 
models.”). 
48 Directive 2000/31/EC, of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 8 June 2000 on Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society 
Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market 
(Directive on Electronic Commerce), art. 3, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 9, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu (search for “Directive 2000/31/EU”) [https://perma.cc/XQ37-
88KC]; BLÁZQUEZ ET AL., supra note 16, at 40 (“[C]ontrary to what happens 
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of destination” principle, the Member State receiving 
audiovisual services determines the applicable copyright 
regulations and also is responsible for monitoring and 
enforcement.49 This directly contrasts with audiovisual 
content-related issues, where the Member State of 
establishment has the right to regulate and intervene under 
the AVMSD “country of origin” principle.50 As a result, 
within the realm of copyright, EU law has had little impact 
on the territorial fragmentation of Member States’ copyright 
regimes.51 
The SatCab Directive introduces the “country of origin” 
principle as governing communications to the public by 
satellite. However, contractual licensing practices and signal 
encryption techniques often circumvent application of this 
principle.52 Furthermore, while Article 20 of the Services 
Directive (“SD”) explicitly prohibits price discrimination 
practices and availability restrictions between Member 
States, it provides an exception where objective reasons to 
utilize such practices exist.53 The territoriality of copyright is 
often claimed as a legitimate objective reason.54 In the end, 
“the territoriality principle mostly prevails and any service 
provider offering[,] e.g.[,] copyrighted works online in more 
than one member state will have to clear licences covering all 
of these countries.”55 
 
in the AVMSD, Article 3(3) of the e-Commerce Directive lists the sectors 
where this principle is reversed in favour of the country of destination.”).  
49 BLÁZQUEZ ET AL., supra note 16, at 34, 40. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 40.  
52 BLÁZQUEZ ET AL., supra note 16, at 30. 
53 Gomez & Martens, supra note 34, at 1. 
54 Id.  
55 BLÁZQUEZ ET AL., supra note 16, at 30. See also Gomez & Martens, 
supra note 34, at 1 (“The EU Copyright Directive (2001) has to some 
extent harmonized copyright law between Member States but it remains 
essentially national law.”). 
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B. Territorial Exclusivity in Practice 
1.  Commercial Considerations in Licensing Deals 
The preservation of territoriality in copyright to this point 
has largely been a reflection of its economic necessity. 
Territorial licensing plays a fundamental role in the 
financing of films and television shows, and many 
stakeholders in the audiovisual industry consider it to be an 
indispensable legal and business framework.56 As EU law 
stands now, the rights for audiovisual content are generally 
negotiated on a country-by-country basis, as well as on the 
basis of common linguistic area or common socio-cultural 
background (e.g., Scandinavia).57 The exclusive territorial 
basis on which rights are sold allows rights-holders to target 
markets with higher demand to maximize revenues and 
tailor content to the preferences of the audiences in each 
market.58 
Audiovisual works are unique relative to other 
copyrightable works, in part due to their expensive 
production costs and multitude of rights-holders, which may 
include the screenwriter, film director, composer of the 
soundtrack, and others.59 Due to high production and 
marketing costs, films are risky investments, often taking 
several years to develop and produce.60 In order to obtain the 
necessary financing to produce their films, many filmmakers 
rely on the territorial sale of exclusive distribution rights.61 
 
56 Scott Roxborough, Europe to Unveil Plans to Reform Copyright, 
Introduce Digital Single Market, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Dec. 9, 2015, 12:09 
AM), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/europe-unveils-plans-
reform-copyright-847135 [https://perma.cc/2V8W-FT9R]. 
57 BLÁZQUEZ ET AL., supra note 16, at 33. 
58 Scourfield et al., supra note 15. 
59 BLÁZQUEZ ET AL., supra note 16, at 43. 
60 Id. at 18. 
61 CHARLES-EDOUARD RENAULT & ROB H. AFT, FROM SCRIPT TO SCREEN: 
THE IMPORTANCE OF COPYRIGHT IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF FILMS 30–32 
(2011), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/copyright/950/wipo_pub_950.
pdf [https://perma.cc/42EW-WXDS]. 
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In particular, content producers often use territorial pre-
sales agreements with television broadcasters and 
distributors as a way of obtaining financing at the initial 
stages of a project.62 These agreements make it possible to 
afford the high initial production costs and can also work as 
collateral for a production loan from a bank.63 Under a 
typical pre-sale agreement, a distributor in a particular 
territory provides an advance payment and, in return, the 
content producer gives the distributor a distribution license 
on a territory-by-territory basis, providing the distributor the 
possibility to profit from the investment.64 Producers of most 
major independent movies, including big names such as The 
Hunger Games and The Wolf of Wall Street, as well as most 
big European films, finance their works through pre-selling 
territorial distribution rights.65 
Besides project funding concerns, producers of 
audiovisual programs typically grant exclusive distribution 
licenses with territorial restrictions for other commercial 
reasons as well.66 For one, chosen distributors often have 
local expertise in their respective territories and are well 
equipped to cater their distribution strategies for films 
within markets that a producer may consider foreign or 
unfamiliar.67 In a highly fragmented and heterogeneous 
market such as the EU’s, local expertise on the languages 
and preferences of the culture in each territory is critically 
advantageous in the cross-border distribution of films. 




64 Id. at 31–32. 
65 Roxborough, supra note 6. 
66 Gomez & Martens, supra note 34, at 2. 
67 BLÁZQUEZ ET AL., supra note 16, at 20; Tal Kra-Oz, Geoblocking and 
the Legality of Circumvention 11 (Hebrew University of Jerusalem Legal 
Research Paper No. 15-31, 2014) (on file with author) (“Film studios and 
music companies long ago recognized the benefits of reaching agreements 
on the state level with local distribution companies specializing in specific 
markets . . . . [L]ocal companies [are] far more adept at the physical 
distribution and the tailoring of marketing to local audiences.”).  
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over an extended period of time.68 As one commentator has 
observed, “reasons for this are both logistical (the costs of 
global marketing and distribution are high, and a sequential 
release can help mitigate them) and geo-cultural (traditional 
“summer blockbusters” released in the United States and 
Europe in July might be less relevant during those same 
months in the wintry Southern Hemisphere).”69 Based on 
similar commercial considerations, broadcasters in the 
digital world may also stagger releases of films and 
television episodes onto online streaming platforms such as 
Netflix. These online platforms depend on territorial 
exclusivity to allow for staggered releases; without them, 
films and shows would have a practically worldwide 
simultaneous release once available online in any one 
territory. Third, territorial exclusivity also allows producers 
and distributors to charge different prices in different 
territories for the same product based on price levels and 
demand for the content in each territory.70 This is 
particularly true for sports programs, where the value of 
media rights within a team’s main market, where the level of 
interest is highest, can vary substantially from the value of 
those rights in other markets.71 Furthermore, broadcasters 
 
68 See Elsa Keslassy, Why Film Bizzers Are Still Outraged over 
Europe’s Digital Single Market Plan, VARIETY (May 5, 2015), 
http://variety.com/2015/film/news/digital-single-market-european-
commission-geoblocking-protest-1201487308 [https://perma.cc/D2B6-
53RC]. “Today, a movie can take up to two years to get theatrically 
released across all of Europe” because “[e]very distributor has its own 
timeline and strategy.” Id. (quoting Daniela Elstner, managing director of 
Doc & Film International and vice president of ADEF).  
69 Kra-Oz, supra note 67, at 9. 
70 Id. at 9, 10. 
71 Commission Staff Working Document, supra note 5, at 27 n.116.  
Taking the example of professional football, the English 
Premier League currently sells its media rights annually 
for EUR 1.3 billion in the UK, and a total of around EUR 
200 million in the other 27 EU national territories 
combined. This reflects the product’s primarily national 
audience, with a value that is much higher in the UK than 
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can tailor commentary and advertising specifically to the 
local crowd according to its interests.72 The resulting price 
and content flexibility from territoriality allows for a more 
efficient market. 
Territorial exclusivity provides incentives for rights-
holders to invest in products not only initially, but also on an 
ongoing basis through content promotion. Within the 
territorial exclusivity framework, if a film or television series 
were sold to the entire EU today, it could be contractually 
licensed separately for upwards of twenty-eight different 
territories. Vertical agreements between content producers 
and distributors may contain clauses limiting producers’ 
ability to license domestic or cross-border availability of the 
relevant content to other distributors.73 The buyers of the 
license in each of those territories, whether they are film 
distributors, television channels, or streaming video on-
demand platforms (“SVoD”) like Netflix, need to be certain of 
their exclusive rights for use and broadcast in those 
territories. Considering the high investment required for 
promotional campaigns by local distributors, these 
distributors only make that investment if there is a 
reasonable expectation of profit. Without the enforcement of 
exclusive rights, there is a risk that competing distribution 
channels (television, DVD, and online), both domestically 
and abroad, may “benefit from the spill-over effects of [a 
distributor’s] costly . . . promotion campaign.”74 As the EC 
notes, “[w]ell-defined property rights are a pre-condition for 
markets to work efficiently.”75 If territorial exclusivity were 
 
anywhere else. In France, the rights for Ligue-1 are sold for 
EUR 700 million, while the income for Ligue-1 from sales 
in the rest of Europe amount to EUR 70 million. The 
situation is similar for other national sports competitions. 
Id. 
72 See Scourfield et al., supra note 15. 
73 Gomez & Martens, supra note 34, at 2. 
74 Id. at 18.  
75 Commission Staff Working Document, supra note 5, at 28.  
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to be eliminated as a viable framework of distribution, “this 
system falls apart.”76 
2.  Geo-blocking 
In order to protect the territorial exclusivity of copyright 
licenses and commercial agreements between broadcasters 
and producers for digital content, stakeholders employ 
measures known within the telecommunications industry as 
“geo-blocking.” Geo-blocking measures are “commercial 
practices that prevent online customers from accessing and 
purchasing a product or a service from a website based in 
another member state or which automatically re-routes them 
to a local site.”77 These measures allow “media content 
providers to restrict consumers from one Member State from 
accessing content available in another Member State 
precisely because the rights holder has licensed the content 
to the provider on an exclusive territorial basis.”78 
Furthermore, “[g]eo-blocking can also restrict customers’ 
access to online services purchased in their home country . . . 
when abroad.”79 When consumers abroad attempt to view 
geo-blocked content, they are often unable to access it or are 
automatically redirected to a local version of the website, 
which may offer a different catalogue than that available in 
their territory of residence.80 
To identify the physical location of an online user, content 
distributors rely on geo-location techniques.81 At the most 
basic level, this could entail a website asking users to self-
report their location from a dropdown menu on the website.82 
Content distributors may also rely on hardware with GPS 
capabilities, such as smartphones, to determine a user’s 
 
76 Roxborough, supra note 6. 
77 BLÁZQUEZ ET AL., supra note 16, at 26. 
78 Scourfield et al., supra note 15. 
79 BLÁZQUEZ ET AL., supra note 16, at 26. 
80 Commission Staff Working Document, supra note 5, at 26. 
81 Kra-Oz, supra note 67, at 3. 
82 Id. 
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location.83 Most commonly, distributors use Internet Protocol 
(“IP”) addresses: geographically based unique numbers 
assigned to all internet-accessing devices.84 IP addresses 
provide an approximate estimation of the user’s location 
sufficient to determine whether or not to make content 
available to the user.85 Beyond ensuring compliance with a 
contractual obligation to make copyrighted content available 
only in certain countries, distributors implement geo-location 
for various other reasons, such as localization of content (e.g., 
weather reports) and compliance with domestic laws (e.g., 
preventing access to gambling sites in countries where online 
gambling is illegal).86 The geo-blocking of streaming 
technologies enables territorial exclusivity in audiovisual 
licensing deals at a degree previously unfeasible, allowing for 
an “infinitely more comprehensive classification of 
markets.”87 
While geo-blocking is a crucial tool for the audiovisual 
industry, many regard it as a nuisance. For one, 
international travelers often find the effects of geo-blocking 
inconvenient and infuriating.88 A resident of Germany 
travelling on business to neighboring France may be unable 
to access the same German content he purchased while at 
home. Instead, due to geo-blocking, he will receive a message 
stating that the content is not available. Consumers in 





86 See Marketa Trimble, The Future of Cybertravel: Legal Implications 
of the Evasion of Geolocation, FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 
567, 592–93 (2012). 
87 Kra-Oz, supra note 67, at 11. 
88 See Cécile Barbière, Geo-Blocking Attacked From All Sides, 
EURACTIV.COM (Samuel White trans., Mar. 12, 2015), http://www.euractiv.
com/sections/infosociety/geo-blocking-attacked-all-sides-312811 [https:// 
perma.cc/PK7X-B5Y2] (“Andrus Ansip, Commission Vice-President for the 
Digital Single Market, complained about geo-blocking . . . ‘If I can watch a 
football match in Estonia, but not in Brussels, it is quite simply unfair,’ he 
told MEPs at his European Parliament hearing.”). 
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licensed their product to an online platform (e.g., Netflix) due 
to market dynamics also have reasons to dislike the effects of 
geo-blocking. Often these consumers will be unable to legally 
view the content. For instance, an Internet user in Lithuania 
who wishes to view programs on the BBC’s iPlayer is out of 
luck.89 Lastly, due to the price discrimination practices 
discussed above, residents of countries that are charged 
higher prices for the same content selling at much lower 
prices in neighboring territories may feel that the effects of 
geo-blocking are unfair. Because of these various 
frustrations, geo-blocking circumvention is a growing trend. 
3. Circumvention and VPN 
As markets and legislatures work to respond to the 
consumer demand for portability and cross-border 
availability, consumers have begun to take matters into their 
own hands. By utilizing various circumvention techniques, a 
consumer can bypass existing geo-blocking barriers and 
access content that is not licensed for availability in their 
nation of residence. For instance, piracy is one of the more 
legally dubious forms of circumvention, such as when a 
consumer uses file-sharing networks to download 
unauthorized versions of content.90 Currently, “the EU 
audiovisual industry continues to suffer from high levels of 
piracy, [the] impact [of which] on the different markets and 
in particular on the video market is still difficult to 
anticipate.”91 Other consumers bypass geo-blocking barriers 
by use of a proxy, through which consumers reroute their 
connection via an IP address located remotely.  By doing so, 
consumers can disguise their location with one in a different 
territory.92 This can be done “via a free-to-use website (often 
 
89 Spence, supra note 8. 
90 Kra-Oz, supra note 67, at 18–19. 
91 BLÁZQUEZ ET AL., supra note 16, at 25. 
92 Kra-Oz, supra note 67, at 19. 
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less effective), or a paid subscription service, often referred to 
as a [Virtual Private Network (“VPN”)].”93 
The international community currently debates the 
legality of these various circumvention techniques, a full 
discussion of which is outside the scope of this Note.94  Peer-
to-peer file-sharing, particularly with respect to those who 
upload the pirated content, is considered criminal.95 The 
question of legality is less clear-cut with regards to the use of 
proxies and VPNs. For example, a VPN may be used to 
subscribe and pay for access to streaming content not 
available in one’s own country.96 Although the copyright 
holder may receive compensation for their work from the 
VPN user, attempting to misrepresent one’s IP address could 
be considered an act of fraud.97 On the international level, 
the WIPO Copyright Treaty of 1996 (“WIPO Treaty”) gives 
some weight to the illegality of circumvention. According to 
Article 11 of the WIPO Treaty: “Contracting Parties shall 
provide adequate legal protection and effective legal 
remedies against the circumvention of effective technological 
measures that are used by authors in connection with the 
exercise of their rights . . . .”98 The treaty does not explicitly 
state that circumvention is illegal; instead, contracting 
parties must protect against circumvention. Businesses can 
avoid uncertainty through contractual terms of service, such 
as an agreement provision stating that a subscriber may only 
use the service or content within the country in which a 
subscription account was established or in geographic 
 
93 Id. 
94 For a more complete inquiry into the legality of circumvention, see 
Kra-Oz, supra note 67. 
95 Id. at 19; see also Brendan Sasso, Crackdown on Illegal File 
Sharing Begins, THE HILL (Feb. 25, 2013, 4:30 PM), http://thehill.com/polic
y/technology/284661-internet-providers-crack-down-on-illegal-file-sharing 
[https://perma.cc/FRM2-9QEL]. 
96 Kra-Oz, supra note 67, at 29.  
97 Trimble, supra note 8686, a 636. 
98 WIPO Copyright Treaty art. 11, Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 
105-17 (1997), 36 I.L.M. 65. 
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locations where the subscription service is offered.99 Under 
such terms, use of circumvention to access a service outside 
the licensed territory would “appear to almost always 
constitute a breach of contract” and give copyright holders a 
cause of action.100 
Evasion of geo-blocking barriers may become easier or 
more difficult in the future, depending on the technological 
advancement of mechanisms used to detect VPNs on the one 
hand and those used to increase their accessibility on the 
other. One factor indicating the increased ineffectiveness of 
VPNs is “the increasing prevalence” of GPS enabled devices 
that “utiliz[e] satellites to pinpoint precise geographical 
locations” independent of a given IP addresses.101 On the 
other hand, while the use of methods of circumvention such 
as VPN “requires fairly advanced technological prowess”102 at 
this point, as technological literacy grows, it is likely 
circumvention will become more prevalent. Younger 
consumers have come to expect access to their favorite shows 
and sporting events without having to wait for a licensing 
agreement to occur for their territory. As Jörgen Gren, 
adviser to EC Vice-President for the DSM Andrus Ansip, 
pointed out, “[o]ne in five Europeans are already using a 
[VPN] to bypass territorial restrictions and stream shows 
from other countries.”103 As technological literacy among 
Europeans increases, that number could grow. Beyond 
VPNs, many others continue to illegally pirate content 
through sites that allow users to download and share 
copyrighted content free of charge.104 An increase in 
circumvention of geo-blocking measures directly challenges 
the effectiveness and utility of a legal framework of 
territorial exclusivity.105 
 
99 Kra-Oz, supra note 67, at 22. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 19. 
102 Id. 
103 Spence, supra note 8. 
104 Id. 
105 Kra-Oz, supra note 67, at 33–34. 
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III.  THE DSM: PROBLEMS TO ADDRESS, 
PROPOSED REFORMS, AND POTENTIAL 
RAMIFICATIONS 
A. Problems Within the EU’s Digital Audiovisual 
Industry 
1.  Falling Behind Internationally 
The DSM is in part a response to the EU’s desire to 
become more competitive on a global scale within the digital 
industries. Approximately 315 million Europeans use the 
Internet every day.106 Accessing copyright-protected digital 
content is the most common online activity; “35% of Internet 
users engage in playing/downloading of games, images, films, 
or music.”107 However, as the significance of online digital 
content grows, so too does the EU’s fear of trailing the 
United States and other nations in adapting to the demands 
of an Internet-based society. The make-up of Europe’s digital 
market is currently 54% US-based online services, 42% 
national online services (i.e., content produced and viewed 
within a single Member State), and 4% EU cross-border 
online services.108 The manner in which geo-blocking has 
enabled a fragmentation of the EU market into virtually 
twenty-eight sub-markets runs contrary to the EU’s overall 
goal for a unified Single Market.109 Miriam Sapiro, a senior 
fellow at the Brookings Institute and a former Deputy U.S. 
Trade Representative, believes the fragmentation of the EU 
market is “bad for investment, innovation, and, most of all, 
 
106 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, WHY WE NEED A DIGITAL SINGLE MARKET 1 
(2015), http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/sites/beta-political/files/dsm-factsheet 
_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/J278-AR67] [hereinafter EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
FACTSHEET]. 
107 Commission Staff Working Document, supra note 5, at 25. 
108 EUROPEAN COMMISSION FACTSHEET, supra note 106, at 1. 
109 See Mark Scott, Europe Plans to Ease Copyright Rules on Using 
Digital Content, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/1
2/09/technology/europe-plans-to-ease-copyright-rules-on-using-digital-
content.html [https://perma.cc/42GP-HCH5]. 
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consumers.”110 Further, she argues that “Europe has been 
lagging in terms of cross-border digital trade, investment, 
infrastructure, and skills.”111 The EC hopes that the 
reduction of EU cross-border barriers will support the growth 
of EU online networks and platforms and allow them to 
scale-up and compete globally.112 Between 2001 and 2011, 
Information and Communications Technology (“ICT”) 
accounted for 55% of gross domestic product (“GDP”) growth 
in the U.S., but only 30% of GDP growth in the EU.113 The 
EC believes this disparity is due at least in part to the 
“sectoral composition of the corresponding economies” in the 
EU.114 In particular, the “fragmentation of online rights 
along [Member States’] borders” due to copyright’s rule of 
territoriality “entails huge transaction and licensing costs” 
for those offering content online across the EU.115 
Commentators have argued these high transaction costs 
“put[] European content service providers at a large 
competitive disadvantage, particularly when compared to 
competitors in the United States, where copyright is 
regulated at the federal level and no state-by-state licensing 
is required.”116 The EU expects the reforms included in the 
DSM to finally create the opportunity needed to close the gap 
between the EU and the United States in terms of digital 
growth.117 As Ansip puts it, the EU feels that they “have to 
hurry up . . . or we will get left behind.”118 
 
110 Miriam Sapiro, Forging an EU Digital Single Market: Difficulties 





113 Commission Staff Working Document, supra note 5, at 5. 
114 Id. 
115 HUGENHOLTZ, supra note 19, at 13. 
116 Id. 
117 Commission Staff Working Document, supra note 5, at 5. 
118 Roxborough, supra note 6. 
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2.  Changes in Consumer Behavior and the Demand 
for Cross-Border Portability and Accessibility 
In addition to the EU’s aspirations to be competitive on a 
global level, the DSM is also a direct response to changes in 
consumer behavior and the dynamics of the audiovisual 
marketplace. Over the next five years, “global digital 
spending on entertainment and media is expected to increase 
at a rate of 12.1%.”119 European smartphone users already 
“consume more than four hours of video content on a weekly 
basis, almost half of which they view on-the-go.”120 In 
response, “the availability of legal online offers of digital 
content” has also risen, with over “2,500 on-demand 
audiovisual services available in Europe at the end of 
2014.”121 The EC expects growth in key copyright-intensive 
industries to continue globally in upcoming years, mostly 
driven by digital content, with “‘Over the Top’ 
[(“OTT”)]/streaming services . . . see[ing] the fastest rates of 
growth (28.1% [Compound Annual Growth Rate 
(“CAGR”)]).”122 With the EU audiovisual market’s value 
experiencing a slight decline in 2013 to €132.7 billion (-0.4% 
growth), a year after complete stagnation in 2012 (0% 
growth), the EU has a strong incentive to capture this 
growth internally.123 
To grow the value of its audiovisual sector, the EU must 
meet the rapidly evolving demands of consumers and 
businesses. With the rise of OTT distribution of audiovisual 
content and the multitude of connected devices that are 
enabled to stream OTT content, the audiovisual industry 
now operates in a “multi-screen environment.”124 Gone are 
the days of audiences being “captives” to a single television 
 
119 Commission Staff Working Document, supra note 5, at 25. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 25–26.  
122 Id. at 25. 
123 BLÁZQUEZ ET AL., supra note 16, at 9. 
124 Id. at 9–10. 
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set or cinema with a limited amount of content.125 Instead, 
“[g]lobal OTT SVoD revenues are . . . to grow from USD 7.5 
billion in 2014 to USD 21.6 billion in 2020, thereby making 
SVoD services the largest source of revenue for OTT 
video.”126 Meanwhile, cinema attendance is in decline, 
traditional pay-TV revenues are stagnating, and the 
video/DVD market continues to dwindle.127 The rise of on-
demand and on-the-go digital content viewership has created 
a demand for portability and accessibility of digital media 
content in cross-border situations.128 This “soaring demand . . 
. to watch films and TV shows from other countries over the 
Internet is driving a ‘paradigm change’ in European 
media.”129 The market has shifted “from a closed and 
regulated media environment, where content was under the 
control of right-holders, to an open one that’s difficult to 
regulate.”130 The EC reports that “27% of [all] citizens  . . . 
would be interested in watching or listening to audiovisual 
content or music transmitted from their home country” while 
traveling abroad.131 Additionally, “19% of citizens are 
interested in watching or listening to content from other EU 
countries” foreign to their own.132 The statistics indicate a 
clear demand within the EU for cross-border portability and 
accessibility of audiovisual content. 
Due to the territorial nature of the audiovisual market 
and the use of geo-blocking, however, the market is 
struggling to meet this consumer demand for cross-border 
portability and accessibility. A consumer survey conducted 
by the EC showed that, “of the 31% of [the survey’s] 
respondents who streamed films and TV series in the last 12 
months and tried to access streaming services of their own 
 
125 Id. at 10. 
126 Id. at 12. 
127 Id. at 24–25. 
128 See Commission Staff Working Document, supra note 5, at 26. 
129 Spence, supra note 8. 
130 BLÁZQUEZ ET AL., supra note 16, at 10. 
131 Commission Staff Working Document, supra note 5, at 26. 
132 Id. 
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country while being abroad, 43% reported not being able to 
access the content when abroad.”133 Likewise, “of the 38% of 
respondents who streamed live events . . . in the last 12 
months and tried to access streaming services of their own 
country while abroad, 51% reported [failing].”134 Between 
December 2013 and March 2014, the EC conducted a public 
consultation on the review of the EU copyright rules, 
generating more than 9500 replies.135 On the one hand, 
authors, producers, and broadcasters saw a continued need 
to restrict rights on a territorial basis and to guarantee full 
exclusivity to distributors.136 On the other hand, a “vast 
majority of end user/consumer respondents report[ed] facing 
problems when trying to access online services in another 
EU country” and stated that “they are regularly confronted 
with access restrictions depending on the geographic location 
of their IP address.”137 In general, respondents stated that 
they wished to “access all content from any online stores 
whether directed to the Member State in which they reside 
or not” and “consider the blocking of content to be mostly 
arbitrary and unpredictable.”138 European legislators are 
now faced with the task of meeting the demands of an 
increasingly globalized consumer base that expects to be able 
to enjoy the audiovisual service they paid for, regardless of 




135 See BLÁZQUEZ ET AL., supra note 16, at 63. 
136 Id. at 64. 
137 EUROPEAN COMM’N, DIRECTORATE GEN. FOR INTERNAL MKT. AND 
SERVS., REPORT ON THE RESPONSES TO THE PUBLIC CONSULTATION ON THE 
REVIEW OF THE EU COPYRIGHT RULES 6 (2014), http://ec.europa.eu/internal
_market/consultations/2013/copyright-rules/docs/contributions/consultati 
on-report_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y6MN-N5WM] [hereinafter EU COPY-
RIGHT CONSULTATION]. 
138 Id. at 6–7. 
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3.  Market Segmentation 
An inevitable effect of the use of geo-blocking barriers 
within the EU is the segmentation of the market. 
Notwithstanding the EU’s concentrated efforts to form a 
Single Market, the European market, divided into twenty-
eight Member States with twenty-four official languages 
(and many other unofficial languages), remains deeply 
segmented both physically and culturally.139 This 
geographical segmentation and lack of cross-border 
availability of digital content is often attributed to the 
territoriality of the EU copyright regime.140 A study 
conducted by the EC’s Joint Research Centre (“JRC”) found 
that “[c]onsumer preference variables such as cultural 
proximity, a shared language or border[,] and inherent 
preferences for home market products are the main drivers” 
of market segmentation for music and film.141 Based on the 
JRC report, it is evident that cross-border audiovisual 
content availability in the EU is limited. Only around 40% of 
all films offered on a major online distribution platform are 
available in the twenty-seven national country stores, lower 
than that of music (approximately 80%).142 For EU-produced 
films, the availability goes down to about 28%.143 The JRC 
report theorized that this was due to the higher cross-border 
trade cost for film relative to music.144 These higher costs 
include high translation costs, contractual agreements 
between producers and distributors restricting availability 
(i.e., territorial exclusivity), and higher copyright clearance 
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costs.145 Cross-border accessibility of digital content may also 
be affected by other factors such as tax considerations, lack 
of demand in certain regions, or a “lack of incentives for right 
holders to make their content available online due to fear of 
illegal exploitation (e.g. piracy).”146 The JRC study  
determined that, on average, films were available on the 
Apple iTunes store “in 1.1 language versions per country 
store . . . [meaning] most films are available in only one 
language in each store.”147 In the JRC study’s survey of 
overall film availability in the EU iTunes stores, they 
determined that about 30% of all films are available in only 
one or two countries, while only around 10% of films are 
available in almost all EU countries.148 For Video-on-
Demand (“VoD”), the EC determined that less than 4% of 
legally available content in the EU is accessible cross-
border.149 In sum, if the EU is expecting to create a truly 
open DSM that includes 100% cross-border availability of 
digital content, they have a long way to go. Ending the 
market fragmentation caused by the use of geo-blocking 
measures would be a large step towards that end, but, as 
discussed below, may have costly ramifications. 
B.  The DSM Strategy—Proposed Actions 
1.  Background 
In response to these emerging issues in the audiovisual 
industry, as well as concerns relating to various other sectors 
of the European economy, the EC identified the completion of 
the DSM as one of its ten political priorities.150 The DSM 
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strategy, unveiled in May 2015, sets out sixteen key actions 
built upon three pillars: “(1) better access for consumers and 
businesses to digital goods and services across Europe; (2) 
creating the right conditions and a level playing field for 
digital networks and innovative services to flourish; (3) 
maximizing the growth potential of the digital economy.”151 
The DSM is a “broad umbrella term,” “cover[ing] initiatives 
ranging from legislative measures to more general studies 
and aspirational goals.”152 Many of the actions listed are 
commitments to study issues and review rules rather than 
take concrete actions.153 Some have observed that the range 
of measures indicates a fundamental disagreement within 
European institutions on what the main objective of the 
DSM should be.154 On the one hand, some view the DSM “as 
a genuine opportunity to remove regulatory barriers, and 
thereby give digital businesses greater freedom to innovate”; 
others see it as an opportunity to extend existing regulations 
to these digital businesses, thereby leveling the playing field 
and protecting traditional business from the emerging 
disruptive ones.155  
2. The EC’s December 2015 Proposed Regulations 
Two of the actions announced under Pillar I of the DSM 
strategy in May 2015, copyright reform and the end of 
unjustified geo-blocking, directly affect the audiovisual sector 
and address the problems discussed above concerning cross-
border portability and accessibility of online content. On 
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December 8, 2015, the EC released its first set of DSM draft 
proposals on moving towards a “modern, more European 
copyright framework.”156 Since geo-blocking is largely the 
result of territoriality within copyright licenses, copyright 
reform and geo-blocking are fundamentally linked.157 
a.  Unjustified Geo-Blocking 
One of the most significant proposals the EC released in 
December 2015 was a regulation aimed at ensuring the 
cross-border portability of online content in the EU (the 
“Proposed Regulation”).158 The Proposed Regulation provides 
that subscribers of online content who are temporarily in 
another Member State must be granted the same access that 
they would be permitted in their home Member State, 
without any limitations as to functionality, range of content, 
or devices used.159 The Proposed Regulation also provides 
that contractual provisions between rights-holders and 
service providers that restrict or prohibit such portability 
will be unenforceable.160 The Proposed Regulation is expected 
to take effect as early as 2017. It will apply to all future 
contracts and retrospectively to all contracts concluded prior 
to its adoption.161 The European Parliament and the twenty-
eight Member States, however, must first approve the new 
rules, a process that may involve a significant amount of 
bargaining over the details.162 Media industry concerns 
regarding the Proposed Regulation include the accuracy of 
geo-location mechanisms in authenticating a consumer’s 
Member State of residence so that this cross-border 
portability is not abused.163 Some stakeholders fear that 
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ineffective geo-location mechanisms will allow consumers “to 
‘shop around’ and purchase online content services in 
Member States offering the best price.”164 Another concern 
centers around what constitutes being “temporarily” in 
another Member State, as the Proposed Regulation does not 
give any guidelines or clear-cut rules on this issue.165 
The EC’s underlying objective is “to end unjustified geo-
blocking.”166 According to the EC, geo-blocking restrictions 
can be justified, for example, “where the provider of services 
has to comply with specific legal obligations (e.g. consumer 
law) or when it is due to acceptable business practices (e.g. 
higher delivery costs).”167 It is unclear, however, if all geo-
blocking mechanisms used in the audiovisual sector to 
enforce territorial exclusivity will be considered justified or 
not.168 
Prior statements made by the EC’s leaders heading the 
DSM strategy have sent mixed signals. Ansip “has described 
geo-blocking as fundamentally incompatible with the concept 
of an internal market.”169 He has been outspoken in his 
desire to do away with geo-blocking.170 Margrethe Vestager, 
the EC’s Competition Commissioner, “says that geo-blocking 
arrangements, where broadcasters restrict access to movies 
and shows according to which country the user is in, go 
against the spirit of the single market.”171 As she puts it, “I, 
for one, cannot understand why I can watch my favorite 
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paid for, but I can’t when I am in Brussels.”172 This sort of 
portability problem was the focus of the Proposed 
Regulation.173 On the other hand, Günther Oettinger, the 
former EC Commissioner for the Digital Economy and 
Society and current EC Commissioner for Budget and 
Human Resources, believes that the EC’s plans for a DSM 
should preserve the principle of territoriality for the 
European film industry.174 
As it stands now, the December 2015 proposals seem to 
indicate that geo-blocking is unjustified when it restricts a 
consumer’s access to their purchased digital content 
subscriptions while temporarily in another Member State. 
Should future regulations go no farther than that, at least 
some sense of territoriality will be able to remain within the 
EU. The cross-border portability regulation carves away at 
the exclusivity producers and distributors have enjoyed with 
their licenses thus far by forcing them to give consumers 
access to content outside their licensed territory. However, 
the Proposed Regulation may lead to a better outcome for 
producers than a blanket prohibition on geo-blocking 
altogether.175 Media executives in the EU fear that the 
current discussion of portability will eventually lead to 
universal cross-border access, thereby eliminating territorial 
exclusivity in licensing deals.176 
Should the EC later determine all territorial licensing 
used in the audiovisual sector is unjustified, one possible 
legislative reform would be to amend the SD to include 
audiovisual and cinematographic services, which currently 
 
172 Id. 
173 Scourfield et al., supra note 15. 
174 Martin Blaney, Digital Single Market: Oettinger Stresses Special 
Case for Film Industry, SCREEN DAILY (Oct. 27, 2015), http://www.screenda
ily.com/news/dsm-oettinger-stresses-special-case-for-film-industry/509599 
8.article [https://perma.cc/Y3UB-QC62]. 
175 Scourfield et al., supra note 15. 
176 Elsa Keslassy, World Industry Reacts To Digital Single Market 
Proposals, VARIETY (Dec. 9 2015, 8:46 AM), http://variety.com/2015/film/ne
ws/french-orgs-reacts-to-european-commissions-reform-on-copyright-
1201657190 [https://perma.cc/AV6Q-5E3M]. 
WEISS – FINAL 
No. 3:877] AVAILABLE TO ALL, PRODUCED BY FEW 911 
do not fall under the SD.177 The SD is the key EU legal 
instrument used to implement the freedom to provide and 
receive services, and includes principles of non-
discrimination.178 “Article 20 [of the] SD prohibits 
discriminatory requirements based on the nationality or 
place of residence of the recipient of the service.”179 
Currently, Article 17(11) states that the SD’s rules on the 
freedom to provide services do not apply to copyright in 
general, thereby confirming the principle of territoriality in 
copyright law.180 Furthermore, an explicit exception to 
Article 20 exists for objectively justified reasons. The EC 
considers the lack of the required authorization from a right-
holder for a territory in question as an objective reason to 
justify the refusal of service to a consumer in that 
territory.181 Lastly, specifically relevant to territoriality in 
the audiovisual industry, Article 2(2)(g) provides that “the 
Services Directive does not apply to ‘audiovisual services, 
including cinematographic services, whatever their mode of 
production, distribution and transmission, and radio 
broadcasting.’”182 If the EC were to amend these provisions 
and extend the SD to include audiovisual services, the 
legality of standard licensing and distribution practices 
within the audiovisual sector would be in serious question. 
b.  Modernization of European Copyright Law 
Oettinger considers the EU’s copyright rules outdated and 
“drafted at a time where many of today’s possibilities to 
discover, disseminate and share ideas and knowledge did not 
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exist.”183 The EC, therefore, calls for a “modern, more 
European copyright law” and announced forthcoming 
legislative proposals “to reduce the differences between 
national copyright regimes and allow for wider online access 
to works across the EU.”184 To this end, EC President 
Juncker announced his intention to “break down national 
silos” in copyright legislation, among other areas of 
regulation.185 The ultimate goal is the reduction in legal 
uncertainty and transaction costs for businesses and right-
owners participating in cross-border economic activity. 
For instance, the EC likely will aim to “harmoniz[e] 
exceptions to copyright for essential activities such as 
research, education, text and data mining.”186 Currently, EU 
copyright rules “provide an exhaustive catalogue of 
exceptions to copyright”; each Member State can then decide 
which exceptions to implement in their national copyright 
laws.187 The disparities between different nations’ exception 
rules create transaction costs for companies looking to offer 
products and services in foreign Member States.188 In the 
end, the legal uncertainty may prevent companies from 
offering their services in those Member States.189 The EC’s 
reform will likely implement mandatory minimum standards 
for user rights in copyright.190  
Most radically, the EC could enact a unified EU copyright 
law to foster the DSM for audiovisual works. Supporters of 
the unification of EU copyright law deem it the most 
fundamental way to solve the problem of territoriality in 
copyright, “a truly structural and consistent solution, which 
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would immediately remove all copyright-related territorial 
obstacles to the creation of a Single Market.”191 The Treaty of 
Lisbon192 “introduced a specific competence” to the EU 
regarding the protection of intellectual property rights;193 
Article 118 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union provides: 
 In the context of the establishment and functioning of 
the internal market, the European Parliament and 
the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary 
legislative procedure, shall establish measures for the 
creation of European intellectual property rights to 
provide uniform protection of intellectual property 
rights throughout the Union and for the setting up of 
centralized Union-wide authorization, coordination 
and supervision arrangements.194 
Based on this provision, some have argued that the EU is 
concurrently empowered “to introduce Union-wide copyright 
titles” and provide for “the simultaneous abolishment of 
national titles, which would be necessary for such an 
initiative to take its full effect and remove territorial 
restrictions.”195 The effect would establish a truly unified 
copyright framework and replace the current regime: a 
varying network of national rules.196 However, while 
supporters believe the immediate effect would be a single 
market for copyrights,197 it is unclear whether removing the 
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principle of territoriality in copyright directly leads to the 
removal of territorial restrictions.198 Even without copyright-
related territorial barriers, right-holders could still limit the 
scope of licenses via contractual practices, assuming they 
conform to EU competition rules.199 
C. Why Territorial Exclusivity Should be Preserved: 
Economic and Cultural Costs 
In response to the DSM proposals, media industries have 
been generally apprehensive.200 In particular, industry 
stakeholders balk at the notion of an established system of 
territorial licensing potentially being abolished through a 
ban on geo-blocking and reformation of the principle of 
territoriality in copyright.201 The industries’ legitimate 
concerns focus on both economic and cultural considerations, 
as both are inescapably linked in this context.202 If the DSM 
eventually eliminates effective territoriality restrictions, 
“many have argued that only the largest European content 
providers would be able to [compete and] afford pan-
European rights.”203 In turn, the reduced competition could 
significantly reduce rights-holders’ licensing and advertising 
revenues.204 Furthermore, with the creation of pan-European 
licensing deals, there may not be significant enough demand 
for smaller regional works to justify the investment in them, 
thereby reducing the equality and variety of European 
content produced, particularly for minority languages and 
cultures.205 
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1.  Economic 
In addition to reducing the amount of European content 
being produced, elimination of exclusive territorial rights in 
the EU would also reduce the amount of competitive 
European producers. As discussed above, content producers 
have traditionally financed their risky projects through the 
sale of distribution rights in individual territories.206 With 
the elimination of geo-blocking barriers between countries, 
studios and producers would no longer be able to sell the 
same content repeatedly in multiple territories. Instead, they 
would be forced to sell a pan-European license at a much 
higher price tag. Competition among audiovisual license 
broadcasters for these limited pan-European licenses would 
intensify; only a handful of big players would be able to 
purchase the premium content and survive. However, as the 
number of big-name distributors dwindles, the remaining 
few would gain more negotiating leverage against studios 
and producers during license negotiations, leading to a 
decrease in potential earnable revenue. 
The removal of territorial licensing within the EU would 
not exclusively produce losers in the global audiovisual 
market. Large American streaming services, such as Netflix 
and Amazon Instant video, stand to benefit significantly 
from a pan-European market since they are among the few 
firms with the resources and infrastructure to purchase pan-
European rights for premier shows and films.207 Emerging 
online streaming services located in smaller territories, 
which may have been able to thrive in their local market, 
would be unable to compete with the big names on the 
international level. The three main U.S. SVoD services 
(Netflix, Amazon, and Hulu) spend nearly $7 billion on 
content and already have begun to make multi-territory 
licensing deals with right-holders, increasing their 
international presence across the continent.208 This gives 
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them a significant first-mover advantage relative to smaller 
players should the EU shift into a pan-European framework 
for licensing. The ability of the major SVoD services to 
operate on an international level, combined with the 
increasing licensing costs of content, will exclude smaller 
players from gaining access to premium audiovisual 
content.209 Currently, the risk of a few American players 
controlling the audiovisual landscape is already “high,” with 
“Apple (paid entertainment), Facebook (advertising), Google 
(advertising) and Netflix (subscription video) . . . already 
dominating their respective markets.”210 European players 
are left scrambling “to find successful strategies in order to 
exist in the online landscape.”211 Broadening the geographic 
scope of licenses and increasing the costs of content 
acquisition may be serious burdens for European players 
already struggling to compete. 
The EU may look to consolidate the European digital 
market and create audiovisual giants that can compete with 
U.S.-headquartered market leaders like Google and Netflix. 
By reducing the number of EU distributors, larger players 
could swallow up smaller players as the market defragments, 
allowing the remaining giants to scale up and compete with 
their American rivals.212 Unfortunately, American companies 
may already have the competitive advantage of being in a 
large, monolingual market. The EU may be adopting an 
overall protectionist approach in enacting policies targeted at 
U.S. companies currently dominating the EU’s digital 
market.213 However, as stated above, American rivals will 
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likely welcome the ability to easily purchase pan-European 
licenses. Thus, this protectionist approach “could hurt 
smaller EU businesses more than it [would] hamper [their] 
U.S. rivals.”214 Furthermore, as discussed below, losing 
smaller, localized EU businesses would negatively affect 
cultural diversity within the EU as well. 
2.  Cultural 
The EC’s stated aim of harmonizing national copyright 
regimes and increasing cross-border online access to content 
is to “improve people’s access to cultural content online—
thereby nurturing cultural diversity.”215 In reality, however, 
the reforms the EU enacts may have the opposite effect.  
[T]he audiovisual industry has raised legitimate 
concerns that the complete removal of the 
territoriality principle would marginalise minority 
languages and cultures, where it is not efficient for 
large organisations to operate, leading to less 
investment in local and culturally diverse content 
and less opportunity for local sponsorship and 
product placement.216  
As discussed above, a single market European licensing 
zone would open doors for broader offerings to dominate 
markets. The consequence is that it will be much more 
difficult for smaller platforms in local languages to 
survive.217 Kristen Niehuus, an executive at German film 
and television funding body Medienboard Berlin-
Brandenburg, believes a single market European zone would 
virtually “eliminat[e] European co-productions and 
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world without European films would be possible to live in, 
but only if you don’t care about culture.’”218 
With respect to SVoD services, some are uneasy with the 
idea of subscribers of streaming content services 
encountering wildly varying content while travelling abroad 
due to geo-blocking and inconsistencies between how 
different countries offer the services.219 However, such 
variation may be to the benefit of both service providers and 
consumers. The ability to create different versions in 
different areas of the EU allows a service provider to cater its 
service to the specific demands of a territory, such as 
providing locally produced films in the territory’s native 
language. With the creation of a pan-European copyright 
framework, such variety would likely be lost. 
The EC should keep in mind that copyright is a keystone 
of the creative industries. As discussed, a copyright legal 
framework “plays an essential role in providing incentives 
for creativity and for investing in creativity also in the digital 
environment.”220 The EU’s framework of copyright will 
directly influence the way Europe’s cultural landscape 
continues to develop and diversify.221 EC Commissioner 
Oettinger recognizes the societal implications in the context 
of modernizing copyright law and the role of platforms, 
stating: “platforms do not only influence the way books are 
written, but in the end also the kind of books that we will 
read.”222 The same holds true for the audiovisual sector. The 
DSM copyright and territorial licensing reforms will directly 
affect which movies the European people make and see. The 
result could be a shift in European culture away from a 
diversification of national identities towards a continental 
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convergence. For now, the Proposed Regulation was limited 
in scope to the issue of portability, thereby allowing for the 
survival of territorial exclusivity.223 It may be in the best 
interests of the media industry and European culture in 
general to limit the reach of future proposals to a similar 
extent. 
IV. BALANCING CONCERNS OF TERRITORIAL 
EXCLUSIVITY WITH CROSS-BORDER 
PORTABILITY AND PENDING DEVELOPMENTS IN 
THE DSM’S IMPLEMENTATION 
A. Potential Solutions 
The rise in the digitization of content significantly 
impacts the ways copyrighted works and services are 
created, sold, and consumed. On the one hand, it appears 
modern consumers expect access to content everywhere from 
anywhere. On the other hand, content authors and producers 
expect fair remuneration for their works relative to their 
usage and dissemination. This tension is particularly acute 
in the audiovisual industry. The current state of Europe’s 
digital market is highly fragmented and creates unwanted 
legal uncertainty and transaction costs for those conducting 
cross-border business. The proposed reforms discussed so far 
have all been aimed at harmonizing Member States’ laws, 
reducing legal uncertainty, and ultimately increasing 
portability of audiovisual content throughout the EU. As 
discussed, in losing the principle of territorial exclusivity in 
copyright regimes and licensing agreements, rights holders 
would lose leverage in their financing arrangements and 
Member States would lose the ability to promote their own 
cultural values through national laws and contracts. 
Furthermore, as the stage moves to the pan-European level, 
smaller Member States and audiovisual businesses may find 
they are unable to compete with the large American 
companies dominating the market. Therefore, the EC’s goal 
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should be to find a way in which it can preserve the principle 
of territoriality in copyright and rights licensing, yet still 
allow for portability of content throughout all Member 
States. 
1.  Commercial Considerations 
Regarding the question of portability, there is a growing 
sentiment among authors, performers, publishers, and 
broadcasters that the lack of cross-border accessibility does 
not result from the territorial element of copyright or from 
problems in licensing, but rather results from the market. 
That is, consumers do not demand cross-border services, 
possibly due to cultural and language differences between 
Member States; therefore, service providers have no business 
justification to offer them.224 
Whether European consumer demand exists for cross-
border portability, as the EC study discussed above points 
out, European consumers are at least stating they want it.225 
However, “[n]othing in national or EU law precludes . . . a 
film or a music producer from giving a multi-territorial 
licence for more than one country.”226 Broadcasters believe 
that the free market “is naturally moving towards 
addressing [any underlying] demand for cross-border 
delivery of content where it is economically significant.”227 
For example, large U.S. SVoD companies have begun to 
make multi-territory licensing deals with right-holders and 
expect to continue to do so in the future.228 It may be the case 
that the EC, in its discussions regarding the DSM and a need 
for cross-border availability, is glossing over the possibility 
that “the relative lack of cross-border [availability] . . . may 
stem more from consumer preferences, the (perfectly lawful) 
unilateral decisions of businesses to focus on selling in a 
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single country and the regulatory barriers such as 
differential VAT rates that may deter businesses from selling 
across borders.”229 
This Note argues that the territorial nature of copyright 
and exclusive licensing should be kept intact. However, the 
EC should promote the practice of multi-territorial licensing 
through other regulations that lower the transaction costs 
and legal uncertainty of operating in multiple territories. 
This is a far less radical approach than eliminating all geo-
blocking barriers or creating a unified EU copyright law. 
Lawmakers in Member States would retain the right to 
promote their own cultural value through national copyright 
laws based on the economic situation, legal traditions, and 
cultural policies of their specific Member State. Furthermore, 
content producers would be able to continue the pre-
financing of their projects through licensing deals and 
utilizing the local expertise of distributors in a particular 
territory. The underlying principle here is that once the 
consumer demand for cross-border portability and 
accessibility is high enough to make it economically 
reasonable to obtain multi-territory licenses, the market will 
be able to respond in order to supply what the consumers 
demand. 
B. Ongoing Developments in the DSM Timeline 
With the EC’s self-imposed deadline of the end of 2016 
quickly approaching, the EC will need to act fast to deliver 
on the different actions laid out in the DSM.230 The DSM 
strategy in general already faces funding issues,231 and a 
decision from the European Court of Justice on data privacy 
 
229 Cooley Alert, supra note 152. 
230 European Commission Press Release IP/15/4919, supra note 1. 
231 Daniel Thomas, Europe Faces €106bn Funding Shortfall For 
Digital Goals, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2015, 6:07 PM), http://www.ft.com 
(search for the title). (“About €216bn is needed to meet the EU’s digital 
goals but only €110bn of combined public and private investment is being 
planned, according to research commissioned by some of Europe’s largest 
telecoms groups.”). 
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could frustrate the EC’s attempts to create common data 
protection laws for the EU.232 Nevertheless, the EC remains 
in an information–gathering phase. Various public 
consultations are open on subjects relevant to the DSM, 
including geo-blocking, the AVMSD, the SatCab Directive, 
and online platforms.233 These consultations represent “a 
significant opportunity for stakeholders to contribute to the 
shaping of European policy that will have a profound 
practical impact on business across many industries.”234 At 
this point, it seems unlikely that a uniform EU copyright law 
will be introduced by the end of 2016, in large part “due to 
the political difficulties of asking each member state to give 
up their own copyright systems.”235 In general, the DSM may 
begin to take a much more concrete shape over the course of 
the next six months to a year. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Digitization of content has shifted the ways in which 
copyrighted works are created and consumed. The EC now 
must respond to both the modern consumer who expects to 
access audiovisual content anywhere and everywhere, as 
well as the content producers and distributors who rely on a 
framework of territorial exclusivity to finance and support 
their businesses. The EC currently seems determined to 
defragment the EU’s digital online landscape, tear down geo-
blocking barriers, and unify its Member States’ online 
capabilities. The implications of this strategy may be 
devastating to both the viability of many European 
audiovisual producers and the cultural diversity within the 
EU. 
 
232 Dominic Elliott, EU Data Ruling Could Stunt Single Digital 
Market, REUTERS: BREAKINGVIEWS (Oct. 6, 2015), http://blogs.reuters.com/b
reakingviews/2015/10/06/eu-data-ruling-could-stunt-single-digital-market 
[https://perma.cc/6WWX-HXL7]. 
233 Edwards & Tobias, supra note 6. 
234 Id. 
235 Id. 
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The problems and discussion presented by the EU’s 
attempt to implement a DSM are indicative of much broader 
existential issues the EU must face. A clear tension exists 
between, on the one hand, the interest to harmonize the 
policies of the EU’s Member States and compete on the 
international scale and, on the other hand, the interest in 
preserving cultural diversity amongst individual Member 
States. Ultimately, the EC’s values will determine which 
actions it takes. 
